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Abstract. We propose a methodology for statically predicting the pos-
sible interaction patterns of services within a given choreography. We
focus on choreographies exploiting the event notiﬁcation paradigm to
manage service interactions. Control Flow Analysis techniques statically
approximate which events can be delivered to match the choreography
constraints and how the multicast groups can be optimised to handle
event notiﬁcation within the service choreography.
1 Introduction
The ability of supporting programmable coordination policies of heterogeneous
services is a key element in the success of the Service Oriented Computing (SOC)
paradigm. Two diﬀerent approaches are usually adopted to assemble services:
orchestration and choreography. In the service orchestration, an intermediate
entity, the orchestrator, arranges service activities according to the given busi-
ness process. The service choreography, instead, involves all parties and their
associated interactions providing a global view of the system. Relevant stan-
dard technologies are the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) [23], for
the orchestration, and Web Service Choreography Description Language (WS-
CDL) [24], for the choreography. Notably, the orchestration-choreography issues
have led to the development of a variety of foundational models (see e.g. [19,12,
2,7,18,10] to cite only a few). We refer to the surveys in [9,22] for an analysis
of the approaches.
In [15,21] a middleware, called Java Signal Core Layer (JSCL), supporting
the design and implementation of service coordination policies has been intro-
duced. The middleware consists of a set of API for assembling services by exploit-
ing the event notiﬁcation paradigm. A distinguished feature of JSCL consists of
the strict interplay among formal semantic foundations, implementation prag-
matics and experimental evaluation of the resulting programming mechanisms.
More precisely, the programming facilities available in JSCL have been seman-
tically motivated. At the abstract level, the middleware takes the form of the
Signal Calculus (SC) [17]. The SC calculus is an asynchronous process calculus
with explicit primitives to deal with (multicast) event notiﬁcation and service
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distribution. The SC-JSCL framework allows one to specify and program ser-
vice coordination policies (orchestration and choreography) relying on multicast
notiﬁcation only. Moreover, it features sessions as a mechanism to synchronise
behaviours of distributed and independent services. Remarkably, the middleware
does not assume any centralized mechanism for publishing, subscribing and no-
tifying events. Hence, SC and JSCL have to be properly regarded as a founda-
tional framework and its programming counterpart for specifying, verifying and
programming coordination policies of distributed services.
The JSCL framework has also been equipped with a model driven develop-
ment methodology [13,14,16]. The methodology exploits a suitable choreography
model that takes the form of a process calculus, called Network Coordination
Policies (NCP). The two calculi (SC and NCP) lay at two diﬀerent levels of
abstraction. The former is tailored to support the (formal) design of services,
the latter is the speciﬁcation language to declare the coordination policies. Poli-
cies are processes that specify service behaviour as seen by an observer standing
from a global point of view, hence capable of observing the interactions that
are expected to happen, and how these are interleaved. Indeed, certain features
can be described at both levels: the NCP speciﬁcation declares what is expected
from the service network infrastructure, while the SC design speciﬁes how to
implement it. The gap between the local and global abstraction levels has been
formally ﬁlled in [13,17]. It has been proved that for each SC design, there exists
an NCP choreography that reﬂects all the properties of the design. The confor-
mance of an SC design with respect to an NCP speciﬁcation is formally proved
by checking weak asynchronous bisimilarity [1] between them. This notion of
conformance has the main beneﬁt of supporting the development of systems in
a model driven development fashion. The designer can deﬁne a suitable chain of
SC models that implement the choreography: each model is obtained by reﬁne-
ment steps that add more details. The conformance of each model with respect
to the NCP speciﬁcation provides the formal machinery to choose the required
level of abstraction, so that one can focus on coordination of services, without
considering the implementation details, or focus on service design, just trying to
match the abstract policies requirements.
The present paper aims at contributing to this line of research. Our long-term
goal is to equip the JCSL middleware with semantic-based toolkits supporting its
design, development, and deployment. In particular, this paper develops static
reasoning techniques for the JSCL middleware. We use a speciﬁc static technique,
Control Flow Analysis, based on Flow Logic [20]. This kind of static analysis
provides a variety of automatic and decidable methods and tools for analysing
properties of computing system.
Our ﬁrst contribution is the deﬁnition of a Control Flow Analysis for the
SC process calculus, that it is shown to be sound. For simplicity, the analysis
is introduced in two stages: ﬁrst it is developed for a basic fragment of the cal-
culus considering ﬂows and multicast. In the second stage, session management
is taken into account. This analysis safely approximates the behaviour of an SC
design, statically predicting the possible structure of event notiﬁcations. This3
information oﬀers a basis for studying dynamic properties, by suitably handling
the approximation of the static analysis constructs. We have indeed an over-
approximation of the exact behaviour of a system. This means that all those
interactions that the analysis does not include will never take place, while all the
interactions that the analysis does include can happen, i.e. they are only possible.
Therefore, the result of the analysis can be used to predict at compile time all the
possible event ﬂows emanating from a certain service. Implicitly, this amounts
to providing the maximal ﬂow of an event notiﬁcation and, consequently, an
upper bound on the structure of the multicast group implementing the notiﬁca-
tion. Hence, the analysis provides formal basis to optimise the management of
multicast groups of the JSCL run-time.
Our second contribution consists in the development of a Control Flow Anal-
ysis for the NCP calculus. The analysis, that computes a safe over-approximation
of event interactions, can be used to verify whether certain choreography con-
straints are satisﬁed. We can assert that events of a certain type have not to be
captured by a service and then we can statically verify, by inspecting the anal-
ysis results, that this assertion is violated or not. In other words, the analysis
acts in a descriptive fashion: if no property violation is statically found then
no violation of the property can occur at run-time. However, within the NCP
choreography model, the analysis can also be exploited in a prescriptive fashion.
Intuitively, the analysis can suggest how to instrument the SC design to avoid
occurrences of a property violation. For instance, the constraints on event han-
dling mentioned above can be satisﬁed, by instrumenting the multicast group
with a ﬁlter discarding the events referring to the unauthorized event.
Our static machinery has been applied to several process calculi, amongst
which π-calculus (e.g. [5]) and LySa [4] to establish security properties. In par-
ticular, the mixed descriptive/prescriptive approach oﬀered by Control Flow
Analysis has been introduced in [3] to deal with type ﬂaws in crypto-protocols.
Plan of the Paper. In Section 2, we present the simplest version of the SC cal-
culus focussing on multicast notiﬁcation. In Section 3, we completely introduce
the Control Flow Analysis for this version of the calculus. This analysis is ex-
tended in Section 4 to manage the SC notion of session. The NCP calculus and
its Control Flow Analysis are described in Section 5. In Section 6, we show how
consistency between a network of SC components and the global coordination
policy expressed by NCP speciﬁcations is reﬂected by the correspondence be-
tween the analysis results. For lack of space, all the proofs are omitted, but are
reported in the extended version of the paper [6].
2 The Calculus
The Signal Calculus (SC) [17], is a process calculus speciﬁcally designed to de-
scribe coordination of services distributed over a network. The calculus is based
on the event notiﬁcation paradigm. SC building blocks are called components,
which interact by issuing/reacting to events. A component contains a behaviour,4
for instance, a “simple” service, interacting through an asynchronous signal pass-
ing mechanism. Each component stores information about the collection of com-
ponents that must be notiﬁed whenever events are issued (event ﬂow). When
an event is raised by a component, several envelopes are generated to notify
all components in the ﬂow (multicast notiﬁcation). Each envelope, also called
signal, contains the event itself and the address of the target component. Each
component owns a set of signal handlers associated to type event. Usually, in the
event notiﬁcation literature, the type of an event is called topic. Signal handlers,
called reactions, are responsible for the management of the reception of an event
notiﬁcation. Indeed, the reception of a signal acts like a trigger that activates
the execution of a new behaviour, described by the compatible reaction within
the component.
The component interface is deﬁned by its reactions and ﬂows. The language
primitives allow one to dynamically modify the component interfaces topology
of the coordination, by adding new ﬂows and reactions. Finally, components are
structured to build a network of services. A network provides the facility to
transport signals containing the events exchanged among components.
Let A, ranged over by a, b, c..., be a ﬁnite set of components names, and
T , ranged over by τ1,...,τk, be a ﬁnite set of topics. We use ˜ a to denote a set
of names a1,...,an. A component is written as a[B]R
F and represents the service
uniquely identiﬁed by the name a, i.e. its public address. Each component has
internal behaviour B, reaction R and ﬂow F.
N ::= networks
| 0 empty network
| N||N parallel composition
| a[B]
R
F component
| hτi@a signal envelope
B ::= behaviour
| 0 empty behaviour
| rupd(R);B reaction update
| fupd(F);B ﬂow update
| outhτi;B event emission
| ;B internal behaviuor
| B|B parallel composition
R ::= reactions
| 0 empty reaction
| τ m B unit reaction
| R|R parallel composition
F ::= ﬂows
| 0 empty ﬂow
| τ   ˜ a unit ﬂow
| F|F parallel composition
Fig.1. Syntax of SC, version 1
The syntax of SC is presented in Fig. 1. A reaction R is a multiset, possibly
empty, of unit reactions. A unit reaction τ m B triggers the execution of the
behaviour B upon reception of a signal tagged by the topic τ. A ﬂow F is a set,
possibly empty, of unit ﬂows. A unit ﬂow τ   ˜ a describes the set of component
names ˜ a where raised events having τ as topic have to be delivered. We deﬁne
F ↓τ as the set of ˜ b such that τ   ˜ b occurs in F.5
(SKIP)
a[;B1 | B2]R
F → a[B1 | B2]R
F
(RUPD)
a[rupd(R1);B1 | B2]R
F → a[B1 | B2]
R|R1
F
(FUPD)
a[fupd(F1);B1 | B2]R
F → a[B1 | B2]R
F|F1
(OUT)
F ↓τ= ˜ b
a[outhτi;B1 | B2]R
F → a[B1 | B2]R
F||Πbi∈˜ bhτi@bi
(IN)
hτi@a||a[B1]
R|τmB2
F → a[B1|B2]
R|τmB2
F
(PAR)
N → N1
N||N2 → N1||N2
(STRUCT)
N ≡ N1 → N2 ≡ N3
N → N3
Fig.2. Reduction Semantics of SC
A behaviour B is a multiset of simple behaviours. The reaction part of
the component interface can be extended by the reaction update rupd(R);B.
Similarly, the ﬂow update fupd(F);B extends the component ﬂows. The asyn-
chronous event emission outhτi;B ﬁrst spawns into the network a set of envelopes
containing the event, one for each component name declared in the ﬂow having
topic τ, and then activates B. The behaviour ;B abstracts from the internal
activities performed by the component (at the end of its execution, the com-
ponent activates the continuation B). Finally, the inactive behaviour 0 and the
parallel composition B|B have the standard meanings. Reactions, ﬂows and be-
haviours are deﬁned up-to a structural congruence (≡). Indeed we assume that
(F,|,0), (R,|,0) and (B,|,0) are commutative monoids, i.e. parallel composi-
tion is commutative, associative and 0 is the identity. Moreover, we have that
τ   ˜ a|τ   ˜ b ≡ τ   ˜ a ∪˜ b. We omit the trailing occurrences of 0.
Networks (N) describe the distribution of components and carry signals ex-
changed among them. The signal envelope hτi@a describes a message containing
the topic τ, whose target component is named a. The empty network 0 and the
parallel composition have the standard meanings. In the following, we will use Q
bi∈˜ b hτi@bi, with ˜ b a ﬁnite set of component names, to represent the parallel
composition of messages having topic τ.
The operational semantics is deﬁned in the reduction style and states how
components, at each step, communicate and update their interfaces. Reduction
rules of SC are given in Fig. 2. Rule (SKIP) describes the execution of an internal
action, i.e. an action that has no side eﬀects on the system. Rule (RUPD) extends
the component reactions with a further unit reaction (the parameter of the
primitive). Rule (FUPD) extends the component ﬂows with a unit ﬂow. Rule
(OUT) ﬁrst takes the set of component names ˜ a that are linked to the component
for the topic τ and then spawns into the network an envelope for each component
name in the set. Rule (IN) allows a signal envelope to react with the component
whose name is speciﬁed inside the envelope. Note that signal emission rule (OUT)
and signal receiving rule (IN) do not consume, respectively, the ﬂow and the6
reaction of the component, i.e. ﬂows and reactions are persistent. Finally, rules
(STRUCT) and (PAR) are standard.
Example 1. Multicast Notiﬁcation. Let us consider a component s that requires
a set of resources to provide a certain functionality. This component is exploited
by several clients ci, with i = 1,..,n, to achieve a common goal. All clients
collaborate to the activation of the service supplied by s, providing the required
resources. The process is summarized as follows:
N
def
= s[outhτri]
τ0mouthτri|τ0mB
tr {c1,c2,c3} ||C1||C2||C3
Ci
def
= ci[0]
trmouthτ0i|τrm0
τ0 {s}
Initially there is a bid phase, in which the service S issues an event to notify its
demand of resources.
s[outhτri]
τomouthτri | τomB
τr {c1,c2,c3} → s[0]
τomouthτri | τomB
τr {c1,c2,c3} k hτri@c1 k hτri@c2 k hτri@c3
Upon the reception of a resource request, a client non-deterministically activates
one of its two reactions: it can ignore the service demand, or as shown below,
ci [0]
τrmouthτoi | τrm0
τo {s} k hτri@ci → ci [outhτoi]
τrmouthτoi | τrm0
τo {s}
the client raises events τo to notify their agreement to provide a resource.
ci [outhτoi]
τrmouthτoi | τrm0
τo {s} → ci [0]
τrmouthτoi | τrm0
τo {s} k hτoi@s
Upon the reception of a resource bid, the service non-deterministically activates
one of its two reactions. If no client responds to the service demand, the bid
fails and the functionality is not provided; otherwise, if it receives a suﬃcient
amount of resources the bid phase terminates, the functionality can be provided,
as shown below.
s[0]
τomouthτri | τomB
τr {c1,c2,c3} k hτoi@s → s[B]
τomouthτri | τomB
τr {c1,c2,c3}
3 The Control Flow Analysis for SC
We now introduce the Control Flow Analysis for SC. The aim of the analysis is
to over-approximate all the possible behaviour of SC processes. In particular, we
focus on how components communicate and update their interface. The result of
analysing a network N is a tuple (B,R,F,E), called estimate for N, that satisﬁes
the judgements deﬁned by the axioms and rules in the upper (lower, resp.) part
of Table 1. Given a certain component a, B(a) gives an approximation of the
possible behaviours of a; R(a) gives an approximation of the possible reactions
of a; F(a) gives an approximation of the possible ﬂows of a: and E(a) gives an
approximation of the possible envelopes to be received by a.
To validate the correctness of a proposed estimate (B,R,F,E) we state a set
of clauses operating upon judgements for analysing processes B,R,F,E |= N,
deﬁned in the ﬂavour of Flow Logic [20].7
Validation. The analysis is speciﬁed in two phases. First, we check that the
estimate (B,R,F,E) describes the initial process. This is done in the upper part
of Table 1, where the clauses amount to a structural traversal of process syntax.
The clauses rely on the auxiliary functions AB, AR, AF, that given a behaviuor
B, reaction R or ﬂow F, keep track of the single unit behaviour occurring in B,
reaction actions in R and ﬂows in F, respectively. Their deﬁnitions are reported
at the beginning of Table 1. In the second phase, we check that (B,R,F,E)
also takes into account the possible dynamics of the process under analysis. This
is expressed by the closure conditions in the lower part of Table 1 that mimic
the semantics, by modelling, without exceeding the precision boundaries of the
analysis, the semantic preconditions and the consequences of the possible actions.
More precisely, preconditions check, in terms of (B,R,F,E), for the possible
presence of the redexes necessary for actions to be performed. The conclusion
imposes the additional requirements on (B,R,F,E), necessary to give a valid
prediction of the analysed action. For instance, in the penultimate clause in
Table 1, if (i) there exists an occurrence of outhτi in B(a), and (ii) there exists
an occurrence of (τ,b) in F(a), then there is a signal envelope with topic τ to
be received by b, i.e. a possible out action is predicted.
AB(0) = ∅
AB(;B) = AB(B)
AB(b;B) = {b} ∪ AB(B) where b ::= fupd(F)|rupd(R)|outhτi
AB(B0|B1) = AB(B0) ∪ AB(B1)
AR(0) = ∅
AR(τ m B) = {(τ,B)}
AR(R0|R1) = AR(R0) ∪ AR(R1)
AF(0) = ∅
AF(τ   ˜ a) = {(τ,ai)|ai ∈ ˜ a}
AF(F0|F1) = AF(F0) ∪ AF(F1)
B,R,F,E |= 0 iﬀ true
B,R,F,E |= N0|N1 iﬀ B,R,F,E |= N0 ∧ B,R,F,E |= N1
B,R,F,E |= hτi@a iﬀ τ ∈ E(a)
B,R,F,E |= a[B]
R
F iﬀ AB(B) ⊆ B(a) ∧ AR(R) ⊆ R(a) ∧ AF(F) ⊆ F(a)
fupd(F) ∈ B(a) ⇒ AF(F) ⊆ F(a)
rupd(R) ∈ B(a) ⇒ AR(R) ⊆ R(a)
outhτi ∈ B(a) ∧ (τ,b) ∈ F(a) ⇒ τ ∈ E(b)
τ ∈ E(a) ∧ (τ,B) ∈ R(a) ⇒ AB(B) ⊆ B(a)
Table 1. Analysis for SC Processes
Example 2 (Multicast notiﬁcation). Back to our example, we report the main
entries of the analysis in Table 2. It is possible to check that (B,R,F,E) is a valid
estimate, by following the two stages explained above. The analysis correctly8
E(ci) 3 τr E(s) 3 τ0
B(s) 3 outhτri,AB(B) B(ci) 3 outhτ0i
R(s) 3 (τ0,outhτri),(τ0,B) R(ci) 3 (τr,outhτ0i),(τr,0)
F(s) ⊇ {(τr,ci)|ci ∈ {c1,c2,c3}} F(ci) 3 (τ0,{s})
Table 2. Some Analysis Entries of the Multicast Notiﬁcation Example
approximates the behaviour of N; for instance it predicts that three envelopes
hτri@ci can be spawn (as proved by the fact that E(ci) 3 τr for i = 1,2,3).
We prove that our analysis is safe with respect to the given semantics, i.e. a
valid estimate enjoys the following subject reduction property.
Theorem 1. (Subject Reduction)
If N → N0 and B,R,F,E |= N then also B,R,F,E |= N0.
Proof Sketch The proof is by induction on N → N0.
The above result can be made more precise, by looking at the single analysis
components. As an example, we just show that the analysis component F cap-
tures all the ﬂows that involve the components of a network N. Clearly, similar
results hold for the other components of the analysis.
Theorem 2. (Flows F) If B,R,F,E |= N and N →∗ N0 → N00, such that the
last transition N0 → N00 is derived using the rule (FUPD) on the set F in a
component a, then AF(F) ⊆ F(a).
Proof Sketch By Theorem 1, we have that B,R,F,E |= N0. Therefore, the
proof proceeds by induction on the transition rules used to derive N0 → N00.
Our Control Flow Analysis approximates the behaviour of the network under
consideration. It provides a safe over-approximation of the exact behaviour of
services: at least all the valid behaviours are captured. More precisely, all those
interactions that the analysis does not consider as possible will never occur.
On the other hand, the interactions deemed as possible may, or may not, occur
in the actual dynamic evolution of the network. Therefore, by exploiting the
analysis’s soundness, we can prove several properties. As an example, we discuss
a property related to the ﬂow of a certain service. First, we introduce some
auxiliary notions. Given a network N, the set of networks reachable from N is
deﬁned as Reach(N) = {N0|N →∗ N0}. Let the ﬂows emanating from a in N
be deﬁned as F(N)(a) = {F|a[B]R
F occurs in N}. The analysis component F
can be used to predict, at compile time, all the possible ﬂows emanating from a
certain component in a network at run time, as stated by the following result.
Theorem 3. Given a network N, including a component a, and an estimate
(B,R,F,E) such that B,R,F,E |= N, we have that {F(N0)(a)|N0 ∈ Reach(N)} ⊆
F(a).
Proof Sketch Immediate by Theorems 1 and 2.9
N ::= networks
| 0 empty network
| N||N parallel composition
| a[B]
R
F component
| hτ c τ
0i@a signal envelope
B ::= behaviour
| 0 empty behaviour
| rupd(R);B reaction update
| fupd(F);B ﬂow update
| outhτ c τ
0i;B event emission
| ;B internal behaviuor
| B|B parallel composition
R ::= reactions
| 0 empty reaction
| R|R parallel composition
| τ c τ
0 m B check reaction
| τλτ
0 m B lambda reaction
F ::= ﬂows
| 0 empty ﬂow
| τ   ˜ a unit ﬂow
| F|F parallel composition
Fig.3. Syntax of SC, version 2
From this static result, we can infer the maximal possible dimension that a
ﬂow emanating from a certain component in a network can reach at run time,
just by computing the cardinality of the set F(a).
Note that similar static machineries can be exploited in the back-end of JCSL
compiler, to optimise the code and the structure of the network interface.
4 Managing Session: a New Version of SC and a New
Version of the Analysis
In the ﬁrst version of SC, information associated to signals is not structured and
topics cannot be created dynamically. Furthermore, the notion of session is miss-
ing: components cannot keep track of concurrent event notiﬁcations. A reﬁned
version of SC, whose syntax is presented in Fig. 3, tackles sessions management.
Events are pairs including a topic and a session identiﬁer. The syntax of
behaviors is modiﬁed by the signal emission primitive (outhτ c τ0i). Note that
both topics and sessions are names and are freely interchangeable. As far as
the reactive part is concerned, a lambda reaction τλτ0 m B handles all signals
with topic τ, regardless of their session. In the behaviour B, τ0 is bound by
the lambda reaction. A check reaction τ c τ0 mB can instead handle only signals
having the topic τ issued for the session τ0 and does not declare bound names.
The syntax of ﬂows has been not changed. The envelope hτ c τ0i@a now carries
both the topic τ and the session identiﬁer τ0. For the sake of simplicity, we skip
the restriction construct.
In Fig. 4, we only give the rules that are diﬀerent from the ones in Fig. 2 and
the new ones. Similarly, in Table 3, we just give the CFA rules that are diﬀerent
from the ones in Table 1. The subject reduction result stated on the previous
version of SC can be easily extended to the present version.10
(OUT)
F ↓τ= ˜ b
a[outhτ c τ0i;B1 | B2]R
F → a[B1 | B2]R
F||Πbi∈˜ bhτ c τ0i@bi
(CHECK)
hτ c τ0i@a || a[B1]
R|τ c τ0mB2
F → a[B1|B2]R
F
(LAMBDA)
hτ c τ0i@a || a[B1]
R|τλτ00mB2
F → a[B1|{τ0/τ00}B2]
R|τλτ00mB2
F
Fig.4. Reduction Semantics of SC
AB(b;B) = {b} ∪ AB(B) where b ::= fupd(F)|rupd(R)|outhτ c τ
0i
AB((ντ)B) = AB(B)
AR(τ c τ
0 m B) = {(τ c τ
0,B)}
AR(τλτ
0 m B) = {(τλτ
0,B)}
B,R,F,E |= hτ c τ
0i@a iﬀ τ c τ
0 ∈ E(a)
outhτ c τ
0i ∈ B(a) ∧ (τ,b) ∈ F(a) ⇒ τ c τ
0 ∈ E(b)
τ c τ
0 ∈ E(a) ∧ (τ c τ
0,B) ∈ R(a) ⇒ AB(B) ⊆ B(a)
τ c τ
0 ∈ E(a) ∧ (τλτ
00,B) ∈ R(a) ⇒ AB({τ
0/τ
00}B) ⊆ B(a)
Table 3. Analysis for SC Processes, version 2
5 The Network Coordination Policies Calculus and its
Analysis
The Calculus We now conclude the presentation of JCSL framework, by in-
troducing the choreography model. This takes the form of an asynchronous cal-
culus, called Network Coordination Policies (NCP) [17]. Intuitively, SC is used
to support the design of services, while NCP is the speciﬁcation language used
to declare the coordination policies. Policies are processes that represent the
behavior as observed from a global point of view, i.e. by observing all the pub-
lic interactions on the network infrastructure. Hence, an NCP process describes
the interactions that are expected to happen and how these are interleaved. The
NCP speciﬁcation declares what is expected from the service network infrastruc-
ture, whereas the SC design speciﬁes how to implement it. NCP adheres to the
multicast notiﬁcation mechanism of SC, however, while SC exploits the notion
of ﬂows, NCP manages this information by a global point of view, introducing
the notion of network topologies. In other words, a network topology represents
the ﬂows of all components involved by the coordination.
A NCP speciﬁcation consists of two entities: a policy and a network topology.
The former describes the actions that should be performed by components, while
the latter describes the component inter-connection. A network topology is a
structure G = (V,E), where V ⊆ A consists of the restricted component names
of the network and E ⊆ A×T ×A are the ﬂow connections among components:
(a,τ,b) ∈ E represents a ﬂow form a towards b for signal of topic τ. Note that G
induces a directed labelled graph, called topic-graph. We will use the following11
P ::= coordination policies
|
P
i∈I pi@ai.Pi non-det. guarded choice
| ττ
0@a.P policy
| hτ c τ
0i@a signal envelope
| fupd(F)@a.P ﬂow update
| ι.P internal activity
| P||P parallel composition
p ::=
| τ(τ
0) lambda input
| ττ
0 check input
Fig.5. Syntax of NCP
α ::= actions
|  silent action
| ττ
0@a free reaction activation
| (ττ
0@a) message reception
| hτ c τ
0i@a bound event notiﬁcation
Fig.6. NCP actions
auxiliary notations: (i) the ﬂows emanating from a in G, G(a) = {(τ,b)|(a,τ,b) ∈
E}; (ii) the topic-graph of τ in G, G(τ) = {(a,τ0,b) ∈ E|τ0 = τ}; (iii) the ﬂow
projection of τ for a in G, G(τ,a) = {b|(τ,b) ∈ G(a)}.
The syntax of NCP is presented in Fig. 5. For the sake of simplicity, we
consider the restriction-free fragment of NCP. As a consequence in the semantics,
we will skip the rules (OPEN), (CLOSE) and (NEW). Let G be an NCP topology
and P an NCP policy, then the pair hG;Pi is called NPC state. NPC states
represent the speciﬁcations of a system.
An NCP process is called a coordination policy. Non-deterministic (guarded)
choice is denoted as
P
i∈I pi@ai.Pi; a policy p@a.P represents an action p ex-
ecuted by the component a with continuation P; preﬁx τ(τ0) allows to receive
on τ and is called lambda input since it corresponds to the SC lambda reaction;
ττ0 allows to receive signals having topic τ and session τ0 and is therefore called
check input. Since a lambda input can handle events regardless their sessions,
the name τ0 represents a binder for the received session identiﬁer. The policy
ττ0 raises an event on session τ0 with topic τ. The component delivers the cor-
responding notiﬁcations to all services that are subscribed on the topic τ. The
envelope hτ c τ0i@a represents a pending message/notiﬁcation on the network
towards a. Notice that only the target of the envelope is declared. Also in NCP,
the emission of an event and its reception are performed in two phases. Initially,
the emitter spawns into the network the proper envelopes, according with the
actual network topology. Subsequently, a subscriber can react to the received
envelope. The policy fupd(F) adds F to the ﬂows departing from a. Preﬁx ι.P
represents the execution of an internal activity before the execution of P. Finally,
coordination policies can be composed in parallel.
The operational semantics of NCP is speciﬁed by the labelled transition
system (LTS), reported in Fig. 7. Labels α are deﬁned in Fig. 6.12
(SKIP) hG;ι.Pi
 → hG;Pi
(FUPD) hG;fupd(F)@a.Pi
 → hG ] (a  F);Pi where a  F = {(a,τ,b)|(τ,b) ∈ F}
(EMIT) hG;ττ
0@a.Pi
 → hG;P||Πb∈G(τ,a)hτ c τ
0i@bi
(NOTIFY) hG;hτ c τ
0i@ai
τ c τ0@a
→ hG;0i
(LAMBDA)
j ∈ I pj = τ(τ1)
hG;
P
i∈I pi@ai.Pii
ττ0
1@a
→ hG ] τ0
1   T;{τ0
1/τ1}Pj||pj@aj.Pji
where τ
0
1   T = {(a,τ,b)|(a,b) ∈ T}
(CHECK)
j ∈ I pj = ττ
0
hG;
P
i∈I pi@ai.Pii
pj@aj → hG;Pji
(ASYNCH)
hG;Pi
(ττ0@a)
→ hG;P||hτ c τ0i@ai
(COM)
hG;P0i
ττ0@a → hG;P
0
0i hG;P1i
hτ c τ0i@a
→ hG;P
0
1i
hG;P0||P1i
 → hG;P 0
0||P 0
1i
(PAR)
hG;P0i
α → hG
0;P
0
0i
hG;P0||P1i
α → hG0;P 0
0||P1i
Fig.7. NPC LTS
Rule (SKIP) trivially ﬁres the silent action. Rule (FUPD) changes the net-
work topology, by appending the sub-network aF to the environment G, i.e. all
the ﬂows departing from a in F. Rule (EMIT) allows for multicast communi-
cations: it spawns in the network an envelope for each subscriber in G(τ)(a).
Note that the continuation policy P is executed regardless the reception of en-
velopes as typical in asynchronous communications. Notiﬁcation of envelopes is
ruled by (NOTIFY) as much like as the output in the asynchronous π-calculus.
Rules (LAMBDA) and (CHECK) model input actions. In the former, the se-
lected input pj reads any signal with topic τ and binds τ1 to τ0
1 in an early-style
semantics. When a check input is selected, only envelopes of topic τ in session τ1
can be consumed. Notice that the reception by a check reaction of a topic does
not change the network topology, because the two topics involved by the com-
munication are already known. The reception of a fresh name (τ0
1) by a lambda
reaction, instead, can extend the environment knowledge of the component: the
receiver can discover all the existing linkages involving the received name τ0
1. In
the spirit of early-style semantics, we allow the rule to extend the topology with
any possible graph (T). Diﬀerently from SC, these two rules can express external
non-deterministic choice and can involve several components. Rule (ASYNCH)
permits to any NCP state to perform an input, simply storing the received mes-
sage for subsequent usages, allowing to arbitrarily delay the communication.
Rule (COM) allows the communication of a free session name τ0. Finally, rule
(PAR) has the standard meaning.13
The Control Flow Logic for NCP We develop a Control Flow Analysis for
NCP, with the aim of over-approximating all the possible behaviour of NCP pro-
cesses. The analysis, still speciﬁed in two phases, is reported in Table 4, where
sbj(P) collects all the component names included in P. To emphasise the rela-
tion between the two calculi, we overload the analysis component names B and E
and we use the judgement B,E,GS |= hG;Pi (and, in turn, B,E,GS |= P), that
we make more precise, i.e. BNCP,ENCP,GS |= hG;Pi, when needed. There, GS
stands for the static abstraction of the graph of topics. It includes the initial
graph and all the possible arcs and vertices that can be added during the com-
putation. The clauses rely on the auxiliary function AP, that given a process
P, keeps track of the single actions in P, and whose deﬁnition is in the upper
part of Table 4. Hereafter, we denote with el the generic element of a set. This
analysis is correct with respect to the given semantics. Furthermore, we prove
that GS captures all the ﬂows arising in the topology.
Theorem 4. (Subject Reduction)
Let S a NPC state hG;Pi. If S
α → S0 and B,E,GS |= S then also B,E,GS |= S0.
Proof Sketch The proof is by induction on S
α → S0.
AP(
P
i∈I pi@ai.Pi) =
S
i∈I AP(pi@ai.Pi)
AP(p@a.P) = {((p,P),a)}
AP(ττ
0@a.P) = {(ττ
0,a)} ∪ AP(P)
AP(hτ c τ
0i@a) = ∅
AP(fupd(F)@a.P) = {(fupd(F),a)} ∪ AP(P)
AP(P0|P1) = AP(P0) ∪ AP(P1)
AP(ι.P) = AP(P)
AP(P)(a) = {el|(el,a) ∈ AP(P)}
EP(P) =

{(τ c τ
0,a)} if P = hτ c τ
0i@a
∅ otherwise
EP(P)(a) = {el|(el,a) ∈ EP(P)}
B,E,GS |= hG;Pi iﬀ G ⊆ GS ∧ B,E,GS |= P
B,E,GS |= P iﬀ ∀a ∈ sbj(P).AP(P)(a) ⊆ B(a) ∧ EP(P)(a) ⊆ E(a)
fupd(F) ∈ B(a) ⇒ AF(F) ⊆ GS(a)
ττ
0 ∈ B(a) ∧ (τ,b) ∈ GS(a) ⇒ τ c τ
0 ∈ E(b)
τ c τ
0 ∈ E(a) ∧ (ττ
0,P) ∈ B(a) ⇒ B,E,GS |= P
τ c τ
0 ∈ E(a) ∧ (τ(τ
00),P) ∈ B(a) ⇒ G(τ
0) ⊆ GS ∧ B,E,GS |= {τ
0/τ
00}P
Table 4. Analysis for NCP
Theorem 5. (Flows F) If B,E,GS |= S and S →∗ S0 α → S00, such that the
last transition S0 α → S00 is derived using the rule (FUPD) on the set F in a
component a, then AF(F) ⊆ GS(a).14
Proof Sketch By Theorem 4, we have that B,R,F,E |= S0. Therefore, the proof
proceeds by induction on the transition rules used to derive S0 α → S00.
Note that the above theorem formally represents the projection of the chore-
ography over a component. Namely, it provides the local view of the choreogra-
phy policy.
The NCP control ﬂow analysis can be used to verify whether certain choreog-
raphy constraints are satisﬁed, for instance, on the security side. We can assert
when a service does not capture a certain topic, and then statically verify, by
inspecting the analysis results, whether this assertion is not violated.
Given a policy P and a graph G, let the set of systems reachable from hG;Pi
be deﬁned as Reach(hG;Pi) = {hG0;P0i|hG;Pi →∗ hG0;P0i}. Let the ﬂows
emanating from a in hG;Pi be deﬁned as Ftopic(hG;Pi)(a) = {(τ,b)|(a,τ,b) ∈
G} and Ftopic(hG;Pi)(a,τ) = {b|(a,τ,b) ∈ G}.
A service a does not capture a certain topic τ, when the ﬂow projection of τ
for a is empty in the initial graph G and in every graph reachable from it.
Deﬁnition 1. Given a process P, a graph G, a topic τ, and component a oc-
curring in P, we say that a does not capture τ if Ftopic(hG0;P0i)(a,τ) = ∅ for
all hG0;P0i ∈ Reach(hG;Pi).
Again, an analysis component, GS, can be used to predict at compile time
whether the constraint is respected. Actually, because of safety, we can assess
that if the property is statically guaranteed, then it will also be at run time, as
stated by the following result, whose proof is based on Theorem 5.
Theorem 6. Given a process P, a graph G, a topic τ, and component a occur-
ring in P, if GS(a) = ∅ then a does not capture τ.
Proof Sketch The proof proceeds by contradiction, by assuming that a does
capture τ.
Here, our analysis acts in a descriptive way, i.e. it describes if a property
violation is possible and because of soundness, we can prove that if no violation
is found, no violation can arise at run-time. In the same setting, our approach can
have a prescriptive value. In this case, we aim at preventing violation to arise,
by suggesting how to instrument the code with the necessary checks, e.g. by
enriching the multicast group with a ﬁlter discarding the events referring to the
unauthorized topic.
6 Checking Choreography
Consistency between network of SC components and the global coordination
policies expressed by NCP speciﬁcations is formally veriﬁed in [17]. Veriﬁcation
is based on the encoding from SC networks to NCP policies, presented in Table 5,
and on bisimilarity. This result can also suggest a model driven development
approach. The designer can deﬁne successive SC models for implementing a
choreography model, obtained by incremental reﬁnement.15
The basic idea of the encoding is to transform SC reductions into NCP tran-
sitions labeled with . The encoding uses the following functions: (i) [[B]]a which
takes an SC behaviour B, localised within a, and maps it into an NCP policy;
(ii) [[R]]a which takes a reaction R, installed in the interface of a, and maps it
into a policy; and (iii) [[N]] which takes a network N and maps it into a state.
[[0]]a = 0 [[B|B
0]]a = [[B]]a||[[B
0]]a
[[;B]]a = ι.[[B]]a [[outhτ c τ
0iB]]a = ττ
0@a[[B]]a
[[rupd(R);B]]a = ι.[[R]]a||[[B]]a [[fupd(F);B]]a = fupd(F)@a.[[B]]a
[[0]]a = 0 [[R|R
0]]a = [[R]]a ||[[R
0]]a
[[τ c τ
0 m B]]a = ττ
0@a.[[B]]a [[τλτ
0 m B]]a = τ(τ
0)@a[[B]]a
[[∅]] = h0;0i [[hτ c τ
0i@a]] = h0;hτ c τ
0i@ai
[[N]] = hG;Pi [[N
0]] = hG
0;P
0i
[[N||N0]] = hG ] G0;P||P 0i
ˆˆ
a[B]
R
F
˜˜
= hG;[[B]]a||[[R]]ai where G = a  F
Table 5. Encoding of behaviours, reactions and networks
Control Flow Analysis provides us with an approximation of behaviours,
both for the choreography model (NCP) and the actual design (SC). The con-
sistency result is reﬂected by the correspondence between the analysis estimate
(B,R,F,E) of a network N and that (BNCP,ENCP,GS) of its encoding [[N]]. We
need the following auxiliary function that maps each element possibly occurring
in (B,R,F,E), in the corresponding element occurring in (BNCP,ENCP,GS).
Enc(outhτ c τ0i) = ττ0 Enc(fupd(F)) = fupd(F)
Enc((τ c τ0,B)) = (ττ0,Enc(B)) Enc((τλτ0,B)) = (τ(τ0),Enc(B))
Enc(τ c τ0) = τ c τ0 Enc((τ,b)) = (τ,b)
Example 3. We illustrate this correspondence on the following example, given
by a network N having two components: a and b.
N = a[0]
τλτ
0mouthτ c τ
0i
τ {b} || b[0]
τλτ
0mouthτ1 c τ
0i
τ1 ˜ c ||hτ c τ00i@a||hτ c τ000i@b
The corresponding encoding is given by the following state S:
S = h(∅,{(a,τ,{b}),(b,τ,˜ c)});τ(τ0)@a.ττ0@a||τ(τ0)@b.τ1τ0@bi||hτ c τ00i@a||hτ c τ000i@b
The analyses of N and of S, reported in Table 6, show the correspondence
between the estimates components.
Now, we formally state the correspondence between the two analyses.
Theorem 7. Given a network N and (B,R,F,E), such that B,R,F,E |= N,
let hG;Pi = [[N]] and (B,E,GS) such that B,E,GS |= hG;Pi. We have that for16
E(a) 3 τ c τ
00 E(b) 3 τ c τ
000,τ c τ
00
B(a) 3 outhτ1 c τ
00i B(b) 3 outhτ1 c τ
000i
R(a) 3 (τλτ
0,outhτ c τ
0i) R(b) 3 (τλτ
0,outhτ1 c τ
0i)
F(a) ⊇ {(τ,b)} F(b) ⊇ {(τ1,ci)|ci ∈ ˜ c}
{(a,τ,{b}),(b,τ,˜ c)} ∈ GS G(τ
00) ∪ G(τ
000) ∈ GS
ENCP(a) 3 τ c τ
00 ENCP(b) 3 τ c τ
000,τ c τ
00
BNCP(a) 3 (τ(τ
0),ττ
0@a),ττ
00 BNCP(b) 3 (τ(τ
0),τ1τ
0@b),τ1τ
000
Table 6. Some Entries of the Analysis of N (upper part) and of S (lower part)
all a in the domain of (B,R,F,E), we have that:
• ∀el ∈ B(a) : Enc(el) ∈ BNCP(a) • ∀el ∈ R(a) : Enc(el) ∈ BNCP(a)
• ∀el ∈ E(a) : Enc(el) ∈ ENCP(a) • ∀(τ,b) ∈ F(a) : Enc(τ,b) ∈ GS(a)
Proof Sketch The proof proceeds by structural induction.
The correspondence of the two analyses is made easier by our assumption on
the absence of restriction and scope extrusion in NCP. As a consequence, the
treatment of internal actions is strongly simpliﬁed. The more involved reasonings,
needed to cope with the full calculus, require further investigation.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have introduced Control Flow Analysis for the SC-NCP framework for service
coordination. Our approach is based on a two layer calculus (in the spirit of [11,
12,8]). The abstract level (NCP) provides a declarative framework to specify
the service coordination, while the concrete level (SC) allows us to design the
behavior of services. The distinguished feature of our approach is given by the
mixed descriptive-prescriptive mechanism, oﬀered by the Control Flow Analysis
and experimented to prove security properties of cryptographic protocols [3].
This provides us ﬂexible facilities to manage a wide range of properties.
The SC-NCP programming model has provided the foundational basis to
design and implement the JSCL middleware for services. The correspondence
result, stated in Section 6, provides a further formal hook to freely move inside
the two-level structure of JSCL. Depending on the level of the structure, one can
focus on either the design or the choreography, with the guarantee that the key
features are preserved. Diﬀerently from the dynamic mechanism of bisimulation,
used in [17], static analysis predicts the possible interaction patterns of services
in a given choreography, allowing for a sort of choreography rehearsal.
We plan to equip the JSCL framework to include the reasoning machineries
available by implementing the analyses developed in the present paper. We in-
tend to exploit the analysis to statically verify that a design is compliant with
the speciﬁcation of the choreography demands, and to instrument the code to
avoid the occurrences of certain events at run-time.17
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